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Abstract
This paper analyzes how uncertainty and the timing of its resolution influence the formation and design of
regional trade agreements. Two sources of uncertainty — in demand and costs — are considered. We compare
the case in which uncertainty is resolved “early” (before tariﬀs are chosen), with the case in which uncertainty
is resolved “late” (after tariﬀs are chosen). These cases are, in turn, compared with the benchmark case of
no uncertainty. We demonstrate that, as long as some decisions are made after uncertainty is resolved, trade
agreements have option values. These option values diﬀer across agreements, reflecting members’ diﬀerent
degrees of (trade policy) freedom to respond to changes in the trading environment. Moreover, these option
values may be suﬃciently large as to lead prospective members to opt for a more flexible trading arrangement
(such as a free trade area) over a less flexible agreement (such as a customs union). Indeed, countries may
even prefer to stand alone than join a free trade area under some circumstances. Finally, we show that the
timing of the resolution of uncertainty can significantly impact the type of trade agreement that countries
wish to form.
Keywords: Trade Agreement, Free Trade Area, Customs Union, Uncertainty, Resolution of Uncertainty.
JEL Classification: F12, F13, F15, D81.
∗Department of Economics, York University, Toronto, Ontario M3J 1P3, Canada. Email: elie@yorku.ca
†School of Economics, The University of Sydney, NSW 2006 Australia. Email: mark.melatos@sydney.edu.au, Ph: +61 2
9036 9257, Fax: +61 2 9351 4341. Melatos gratefully acknowledges financial support from Australian Research Council Grant
#DP0665717.
1
1 Introduction
Membership of a trade agreement (TA) usually requires a commitment to a restricted set of trade policies vis-à-vis
trading partners who may be members or non-members. For example, members of the European Union commit
to levying identical external tariﬀ rates on imports from non-members while at the same time engaging in duty
free trade among themselves. On the other hand, members of NAFTA set external tariﬀ rates independently
while committing to remove duties and quantitative restrictions on intra-bloc trade. To the extent that such
policy commitments are diﬃcult to reverse, TAs reduce a member country’s ability to respond to changes in the
trading environment; a potentially costly proposition in a trading world characterized by uncertainty. In this
paper, we are primarily interested in two related questions. First, how does uncertainty influence the type of TA
that countries choose to form? Second, how does the timing of the resolution of uncertainty aﬀect this choice?
Since Viner (1950), the costs and benefits of diﬀerent types of TAs have been extensively discussed in the
literature.1 More recently, particularly following the pioneering work of Riezman (1985), the choice of TA type has
been analyzed as an application of the general problem of coalition formation. Nevertheless, comparatively little
attention has been paid to the question of how countries choose between diﬀerent TA designs under uncertainty.2
A notable exception is the literature on the role of TA membership as an insurance mechanism.3
In this paper, we argue that the introduction of uncertainty has significant implications for TA member welfare
that go beyond the insurance considerations already considered in the literature. In particular, we demonstrate
that uncertainty alters the cost-benefit calculus associated with TA formation in several important ways.
First, consider the welfare implications of the internal trade liberalization implied by any TA. In the absence of
uncertainty, this will benefit members provided that it is not too trade diverting. Under uncertainty, however, and
assuming that the cost of TA renegotiation is prohibitive4 (due to non-trivial reputation costs5 , for example),
duty-free trade among member countries has an extra cost. Namely, an additional constraint that reduces
a member country’s degrees of (trade policy) freedom in responding to shocks to the trading environment.
Alternatively put, the introduction of uncertainty necessitates the consideration of an additional source of welfare
for member countries: TAs have an option value.
1For a comprehensive review of the TA literature see Freund and Ornelas (2010).
2There is, of course, a venerable literature on unilateral trade policy choice under uncertainty. See, for example, the work by
Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1977) and Young (1979), among others, contrasting tariﬀs and quotas under uncertainty. More recently,
Grant and Quiggin (1997) have looked at strategic trade policy under uncertainty.
3Under uncertainty, a trade bloc may have an insurance value for members by binding them more closely to a free trade future
with each other. Ethier (2002) refers to the insurance motive for contingency measures (i.e. unilateralism) within a multilateral
framework. Perroni and Whalley (2000) argue that small countries may seek to join regional trade agreements as insurance against
future protection. Wu (2005) distinguishes between the self-insurance and self-protection motives for trade bloc membership.
4The possibility of trade bloc renegotiation is an important issue deserving of separate analysis.
5 Schwartz and Sykes (2002) argue that the costs of reneging on trade agreements are twofold; the reneging country suﬀers
reputation and credibility costs when dealing with the injured country in the future and also incurs costs when dealing with all other
nations aware of the breach. Maggi (1999) suggests that the dissemination of information is a primary role of the WTO, informing
third parties of trade agreement breaches and thus strengthening the enforcement mechanism of reputation costs.
2
Second, when trade blocs cannot be renegotiated, the impact of uncertainty varies according to the depth of
trade integration - that is, by coalition type - and this must be taken into account at the time of the coalition
formation decision. This is because, apart from the World Trade Organization’s (WTO) “most favoured nation”
(MFN) rule,6 each TA type imposes a distinct set of trade policy restrictions on members. At one extreme,
standing alone aﬀords a country the luxury of choosing its external tariﬀs as it pleases. While a free trade area
(FTA) permits members to choose their own external tariﬀ rates, they must agree to: (i) free trade with their
partner and (ii) a schedule of “rules-of-origin” that determine the duty-free status of goods originating in non-
member nations but traded within the FTA. At the other extreme, a customs union (CU) requires members to
commit to: (i) intra-union free trade, (ii) levy a ‘common external tariﬀ’ (CET) on non-members and (iii) share
the resulting CET revenue according to an agreed formula. In short, therefore, a country’s ability to respond to
changes in the trading environment is governed, in part at least, by the type of TA to which it belongs. Other
things being equal, a TA characterized by shallower integration will tend to have a larger option value.
A third welfare consideration arising from uncertainty relates to the timing of its resolution. Intuitively, the
option value of a TA can only be realized to the extent that TA members have the opportunity to respond
(optimally) to changes in the trading environment after they have occurred. In other words, for the option
value of a TA to be realized, member countries must have the opportunity to make at least some optimizing
decisions after the uncertainty is resolved. Other things being equal, a TA’s option value will be of greater
welfare significance the more decisions member countries make after the resolution of uncertainty.
Reflecting the risks associated with trade policy commitment under uncertainty, the WTO provides a role
for ‘contingency measures’ such as safeguards and anti-dumping measures. Such measures act as a ‘safety valve’
permitting TA members to temporarily, and in a WTO-compliant fashion, renege on their trade liberalization
commitments in order to ameliorate any associated adjustment costs.7 Note that contingency measures are a
response to a particular type of uncertainty; that which arises from a temporary change in the trading environ-
ment. In contrast, this paper examines how countries make (irreversible) trade bloc membership decisions given
that there is a potential for the trading environment to alter permanently in the future. Moreover, since all TAs
must comply with WTO rules, contingency measures tend to be a standard feature of all types of TAs. As such
they are unlikely to explain why countries prefer one type of TA over another - a FTA over a CU, for example.
In this paper, we examine the relationship between uncertainty and TA formation in the context of a partial
6The MFN rule require countries to levy identical tariﬀs on trading partners.
7 See WTO (2009) for a comprehensive survey of this literature. The use of contingency measures can forestall more extreme
protectionist tendencies (Bagwell and Staiger, 1990), help governments garner current domestic support for trade liberalization
when future support is not guaranteed (Bagwell and Staiger, 2005), ‘shelter’ firms in member countries from world price fluctuations
(Freund and Ozden, 2008) and solidify cooperation between members who wish to avoid being targeted by such measures (Martin and
Vergote, 2008). While the inclusion of contingency measures tends to reduce the (terms-of-trade) benefits arising from cooperation,
it allows countries to address the contractual incompleteness of trade agreements (Horn et al., 2010).
3
equilibrium, three-country world characterized by imperfect competition between firms. A three-stage game is
considered in which countries form coalitions in stage one,8 optimal tariﬀs are chosen in stage two and firms
choose their profit maximizing outputs in stage three. In stage one, countries can join a FTA, a CU or choose
to stand alone. Our model incorporates uncertainty in both demand and supply. In order to remove pure
insurance considerations (which have already been addressed in the literature) we assume that all countries are
risk neutral. We examine the role of the timing of the resolution of uncertainty by contrasting two cases: one in
which uncertainty is resolved “early” (i.e., tariﬀs are chosen after its resolution), the other when uncertainty is
resolved “late” (i.e., tariﬀs are chosen before its resolution).
We analyze both the “impact eﬀect” of introducing uncertainty into our trading world, as well as the “marginal
eﬀect” of a change in the degree of uncertainty. We first demonstrate that, for all TA types, and provided that at
least some optimizing decisions are made after uncertainty is resolved, the introduction of uncertainty makes the
countries’ welfare functions convex in the demand and supply random variables. This convexity is the source of
a TA’s option value and implies that a country’s expected welfare increases with demand and supply uncertainty
(variance) assuming a mean-preserving spread. Other things being equal, therefore, under uncertainty countries
will opt for the TA design that permits them to best exploit this convexity. In other words, prospective member
countries will balance the option value benefit against the “usual” costs/benefits of policy coordination and free
trade that typically arise when FTAs or CUs form.
We show that when uncertainty is resolved early, a marginal change in uncertainty (second moments) can
be decomposed into a tariﬀ-independent and a tariﬀ-dependent eﬀect. The former is identical regardless which
TA type forms. The latter, on the other hand, varies with TA type because the random variables influence the
diﬀerent (equilibrium) tariﬀs associated with each type of trade bloc in diﬀerent ways and, in turn, the diﬀerent
tariﬀs aﬀect country welfare diﬀerently. Therefore, it is only via tariﬀs that a change in uncertainty impacts on
the (expected) welfare ranking of TAs by prospective members - our main concern. Specifically, we show that
a marginal increase in demand or cost uncertainty of a particular TA member increases their own preference
for a CU relative to a FTA, while reducing that of their TA partner. In the case of a marginal increase in
demand uncertainty, the magnitude of the partner eﬀect is greater while in the case of a marginal increase in
cost uncertainty, the magnitude of the partner eﬀect is smaller. Consequently, when uncertainty is resolved early,
prospective member countries are (jointly) more likely to prefer a FTA to a CU, when their demand uncertainty
is suﬃciently high or production cost uncertainty is suﬃciently low. This result stands in stark contrast to
the welfare dominance of CUs predicted by most theoretical studies on TAs. Nevertheless, our prediction is
8Assuming no renegotiations.
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consistent with the fact that the vast majority of observed trade blocs take the form of FTAs.
We show that when uncertainty is resolved late, equilibrium tariﬀs depend on means (of the random variables)
only. Consequently, the tariﬀ-dependent eﬀect of uncertainty is zero: thus, only the tariﬀ-independent eﬀect is
relevant. But, since the latter is identical for all TA types, the ranking of TA types by prospective members is
invariant to the source or degree of uncertainty; a CU is always preferred most and standing alone least.
In the last part of the paper, we evaluate the preferred timing of tariﬀ choice in TAs. We show that (assuming
symmetric countries) in the presence of little or no uncertainty, member countries prefer a CU most and standing
alone least, regardless of the timing of the resolution of uncertainty. As their demand uncertainty (variance)
increases, however, prospective members are more likely to prefer any TA in which they can choose tariﬀs after
the resolution of uncertainty. Indeed, when member demand variances are suﬃciently high, member countries
will even prefer standing alone to any TA in which tariﬀs are chosen before the resolution of uncertainty. On the
other hand, as their cost variance increases, prospective members are more likely to prefer any TA in which they
can choose tariﬀs before the resolution of uncertainty. These results reflect changes in the relative importance of
the option value of TAs, as well as the usual cost/benefit calculations in standard TA models without uncertainty.
2 The General Framework - Introducing Uncertainty
Consider a world of three countries in which TAs can form. Assume that one country, Country 3 here, is “passive”
in the sense that it does not sign TAs. Countries 1 and 2, on the other hand, are “active”; they may negotiate
a bilateral TA if they wish. It is further assumed that countries 1 and 2 can choose between two alternative
types of bilateral trade blocs - a FTA or a CU Alternatively, countries 1 and 2 may prefer to stand alone ()
Define the set of three possible coalition structures as  = (  )9 In what follows, all three elements in
 , including the  case, are referred to as “types” of TAs. Consistent with WTO rules, this paper assumes that
all TA types satisfy the MFN principle.
The three countries engage in a multi-stage trade policy game. In stage one, countries 1 and 2 choose a TA,
 ∈  and associated lump sum transfers,    = 1 2. In stage two, given the TA that has formed, all three
countries choose their tariﬀs,     = 13 where  denotes the tariﬀ that Country  pays Country  and
where  = 0 In stage three, given the previously chosen TA and tariﬀs, the firms in the three countries choose
their outputs in each market. These outputs are denoted by   the quantity that firm  sells in Country  For
9The assumption that Country 3 is passive means that we do not have to consider the case of global free trade. This simplifies
the analysis significantly as, otherwise, we would have to consider all possible coalition structures among the three countries, not
just those involving countries 1 and 2. It turns out that in this model, without uncertainty, global free trade dominates all other
types of trade agreements. On the other hand, once uncertainty is introduced, the primacy of global free trade can no longer be
guaranteed. Detailed analysis of the preference for global free trade under uncertainty is left for future research.
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simplicity, we assume that there is one firm domiciled in each country.10 Country 0s firm is referred to as firm 
We assume that the markets are segmented. Country 0 demand function is given by:
 =  −   = 13
where   0 is a demand parameter and  =
3X
=1
 is the aggregate output sold in Country  The technology
of the firms in the three countries is captured by their marginal (and average) costs   = 13
2.1 The Source of Uncertainty
We assume that countries face demand and cost uncertainty. Specifically, we assume that the demand parameter
vector,  = (1 2 3) is a vector of random variables, with means () =  variances  () = 2 and
covariances, ( ) =  Furthermore, we assume that the cost parameter vector,  = (1 2 3) is a
vector of random variables with means () =  variances  () = 2 and covariances ( ) = 
For simplicity, we assume that there is no correlation between demand and cost conditions; that is, ( ) =
0 For the purpose of comparative statics, it is useful to write the random variables as:
 =  +   =  +   = 13 (1)
where  and  are white noise random variables with zero mean and a variance of 1.
2.2 The Resolution of Uncertainty
In general, uncertainty may be resolved at any one of four diﬀerent points of the multi-stage trade policy game.
At one extreme, uncertainty may be resolved prior to the first stage. That is, TAs, tariﬀs and firm outputs
are determined under complete certainty - this is referred to as the “base case” in what follows. Alternatively,
uncertainty may be resolved “early”; that is, between stages one and two. This situation, in which TA choice
is made in an environment of uncertainty, while tariﬀs and firm outputs are determined under certainty is,
henceforth, referred to as “Case 1”. Another possibility is that uncertainty is resolved “late”; that is, between
stages two and three. This situation, in which TA and tariﬀ choices are made under uncertainty while firm
output choice occurs under certainty is, henceforth, referred to as “Case 2”. A final possibility, not considered
here, is that uncertainty is only resolved after all decisions have been made; that is, after stage three.11 In this
paper, it is assumed that once uncertainty is resolved, regardless of when that may be, the realizations of all
random variables become common knowledge to all players.
10Assuming multiple firms yields little additional insight for our purposes while making the analysis more cumbersome.
11This last situation is not particularly interesting since, with risk neutrality, the countries’ welfare functions become linear in
random variables, so that only the means (and not higher moments) are important: uncertainty plays a limited role.
6
3 Case 1: Early Resolution of Uncertainty
In Case 1, TAs are chosen before the state of the world is known, but tariﬀs and firm output choices are made
after uncertainty is resolved.
3.1 Stage 3: Output Choice
In stage 3, the three firms choose their outputs simultaneously in a Cournot game given the chosen tariﬀs and
the TA. Given the demand functions defined in section 2 and the tariﬀ rates chosen by each country, the profit
firm  makes from selling in Country  is given by:
 = [ −
3X
=1
 −  −  ] ≡ (   ;   )   = 13 (2)
where  = (1  2  3) is the vector of quantities sold in Country 
Since markets are segmented, the Nash equilibrium quantities in Country  are obtained by the simultaneous
solution to the three countries’ profit maximization problems given by:
max

(  ;   )  = 13 (3)
Let the Nash Equilibrium quantities in Country  be denoted as ∗  It easy to show that:
∗ = ∗( ;   ) ≡ 14 [ +
X
 6=
( + )− 3( + )]  = 13 (4)
where  = (1  2  3) is the vector of tariﬀs levied by Country  Note that while ∗ depends on the vectors
 and  , it only depends on Country ’s demand parameter  (and not 6=) The Nash Equilibrium quantities
in Country  can be written alternatively as the vector, ∗ = ∗( ;   )
Using equations (2) and (4), the corresponding Nash equilibrium profits, denoted as ∗ [ ;   ] can be
calculated to obtain:
∗ [ ;   ] ≡  [∗( ;   )  ;   ] = 116[ +
X
6=
( + )− 3( + )]2  = 13 (5)
Whereas (not surprisingly) ∗ [;   ] is decreasing in  and   it is increasing in 6= and 6= Moreover,
∗ [ ;   ] is convex in   
3.2 Stage 2: Tariﬀ Choice
In stage 2, the countries choose their tariﬀs given the TA in stage 1 and the known state of the world. We
define the net welfare of Country  (welfare minus lump sum transfers) as the sum of consumer surplus, producer
surplus and tariﬀ revenue. Using the Nash equilibrium quantities derived above, we can explicitly write Country
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0 (net) welfare in stage 3 as:
(;  ) ≡ 1
2
∗2 +
3X
=1
∗ [ ;   ] +
X
 6=
∗(;  ) (6)
where  is the vector of all tariﬀs,  is the vector of all the  terms and ∗ =
3X
=1
∗
In order to be able to examine the choice of tariﬀs, we must consider the tariﬀ restrictions implied by the
three possible TAs,  ∈  = (  ). In what follows, we define the set of tariﬀ restrictions corresponding
to each TA in  as 
3.2.1 Case 1 Tariﬀ Choice: Stand Alone and Free Trade Area
When the countries stand alone in the first stage, the tariﬀ restrictions are simply given by the MFN rules. Thus:
 ∈  ≡ { : 21 = 31 ≡ 1  12 = 32 ≡ 2  13 = 23 ≡ 3   = 0}  = 13 (7)
That is, we only have three tariﬀs to solve for (one for each country).
If countries 1 and 2 form a FTA in the first stage, then 12 = 21 = 0 Moreover, the MFN rule requires
that 13 = 23 Thus, we have:
 ∈  ≡ { : 12 = 21 = 0 31 ≡ 1  32 ≡ 2  13 = 23 ≡ 3   = 0} (8)
Notice that, as in the  case above, with  each country chooses only one tariﬀ. Therefore, it is unclear
whether, compared to , a FTA member has fewer (trade policy) degrees of freedom with which to respond to
changes in the trading environment. This, however, is simply due to the MFN rule. Without the MFN rule, a
country will clearly have greater flexibility to respond to changes in the trading environment under  than 
We can satisfy the (7) and (8) restrictions, by substituting them directly into each country’s welfare function.
Define the resulting net welfare functions for  and  as:
 ≡ (1 2 3;  ) ≡ {(;  ) :  ∈   =    = 13 } (9)
The three countries’ net welfare maximization problems are, now, given by:
max

{(1 2 3;  )  = 13  =  }
If we define the vector of tariﬀs as  = (1 2 3) we can write the net welfare functions as,  (;  ) It is quite
straightforward to verify that for, each country, the net welfare function,  (;  ), is strictly concave in its
own tariﬀ and additively separable in all tariﬀs. As an example, the explicit solutions for 1(;  )  =  
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are given in Appendix 8.1. The separability in tariﬀs, which follows from the (MFN) restrictions in equations
(7) and (8), imply that tariﬀs are strategically neutral and, hence, we can solve for each  separately.12
Let the Nash equilibrium tariﬀ in Country  be denoted as ∗ ( )  = 13  =   The explicit
solutions for ∗ ( ) are given by:
∗ ( ) = 110(3 −
3X
=1
)  = 13 (10)
∗ ( ) = 17 −
1
21
 + 1
3
 − 3
7
3   = 1 2  6=  (11)
∗3 ( ) = 110(33 −
3X
=1
)
First, note that, in both the  and  cases, the equilibrium tariﬀ in Country  increases with its own
demand curve, but is independent of demand conditions in the other countries. Second, the equilibrium tariﬀ
in Country 3 is the same in both cases, (decreasing with unit costs in any country). Third, in the  case, the
equilibrium tariﬀs in Countries 1 and 2 decrease with respect to all costs. On the other hand, in the  case, for
Countries 1 and 2, the equilibrium tariﬀ decreases with respect to their own and Country 3’s costs, but increases
with respect to the cost of their FTA partner.
Now, define the corresponding Nash equilibrium net welfare in each country as:
∗ ( ) ≡ (∗( );  )  = 13  =   (12)
where ∗( ) = [∗1 ( ) ∗2 ( ) ∗3 ( )] is the vector of equilibrium tariﬀs, for  =  . The Nash
equilibrium welfare, for country  can be calculated and is given by the following quadratic functions in the
demand and cost parameters:
∗ =
3X
=1
3X
=1
  +
3X
=1
3X
=1
  +
3X
=1
2   =   (13)
where the parameters   and  are given in Appendix 8.2. It can be easily verified that the net welfare
functions, ∗   = 13 are convex in all the random variables. As mentioned above, it is this convexity that is
the source of a TA’s option value.
3.2.2 Case 1 Tariﬀ Choice: Customs Union
If countries 1 and 2 form a CU in the first stage, then  =  and 12 = 21 = 0. In addition, countries 1 and 2
levy a common external tariﬀ on Country 3, 31 = 32 and the MFN rule requires that 13 = 23 Thus:
 ∈  ≡ { : 12 = 21 = 0 13 = 23 ≡ 3  31 = 32 ≡   = 0} (14)
12Note that since the MFN rules apply to all TAs, including the CU case, this separability arises in all three agreements, for both
early and late resolution of uncertainty.
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Note that now we have seven restrictions, which means that we only have two tariﬀs to solve:  and 3 
In this case, the two CU members choose only one tariﬀ. Therefore, relative to both  and , CU members
have fewer (trade policy) degrees of freedom with which to respond to changes in the trading environment.
Substituting these restrictions directly into each (;  ) yields the net welfare function for Country  as:
 ≡ ( 3 ;  ) ≡ {(;  ) :  ∈   = 13} (15)
We assume that countries 1 and 2 jointly choose their common tariﬀ by maximizing (a social welfare function
which is simply) the sum of their welfare:13
( 3 ;  ) ≡ 1( 3 ;  ) + 2( 3 ;  ) (16)
Country 3 maximizes its welfare function as before.
The problems of the CU and Country 3 are respectively given by:
max

{( 3 ;  )} and max3 {3(

 3 ;  )}
Once again, the welfare functions of the CU and Country 3 are strictly concave in their respective tariﬀs and
additively separable in all tariﬀs. As an example, the explicit solution for 1( 3 ;  ) is given in Appendix
8.1.
Let the Nash equilibrium tariﬀs in the  case be denoted as ∗ ( ) ∗3 ( ) The explicit expressions
for ∗ ( )and ∗3 ( ) are given by:
∗ ( ) = 538 (1 + 2) +
1
19
(1 + 2)− 7
19
3 (17)
∗3 ( ) = 110(33 −
3X
=1
)
Note that ∗3 ( ) is the same as in the SA and FTA cases. Moreover, the  equilibrium tariﬀ is decreasing
with the unit cost of Country 3, but increasing with respect to the unit costs of countries 1 and 2. It also depends
on both members’ demand parameters.
Now, define the corresponding Nash equilibrium welfare in each country as
∗ ( ) ≡  [∗( );  ]  = 13 (18)
where ∗( ) = [∗ ( ) ∗3 ( )] is the vector of equilibrium tariﬀs. The Nash equilibrium welfare for
Country  can now be easily calculated and is given by a quadratic equation that is similar to (13), with the
superscript changed to  instead of  except that now, unlike in the  and  cases, ∗ will have an
13Since 1 +2 = 0 it follows that the sum of the two countries’ welfare is the same as the sum of their net welfare. See next
section (and footnote 12) for a brief discussion of the choice of this particular welfare function.
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additional term that involves the product of 1214 The parameters of the quadratic welfare functions in the
 case, for Country 1, are given in Appendix 8.2. It can be easily verified that the net welfare functions,
∗   = 13 are convex in all the random variables.
3.3 Stage 1: The Choice of Trade Agreement
In stage 1, before the state of the world is known, countries 1 and 2 choose a TA. Given the countries’ risk
neutrality, they simply consider their expected welfare. Note that risk neutrality does not necessarily imply that
only the first moments matter. This would be the case only if all decisions were made before uncertainty is
resolved. In Cases 1 and 2 some (but not all) decisions are made after uncertainty is resolved and, moreover,
as was shown above, the objective functions are quadratic in the random variables. Hence, second moments do
indeed play a role.15
In principle, we could use a general solution concept for the choice of an agreement; Nash Bargaining or the
core, for example.16 Since the specific solution concept is not the focus of the paper, we proceed (for consistency)
by using the same social welfare function that was used above; namely, the sum of the two countries’ expected
welfare.
For any  ∈  ≡ {  ) let the total expected welfare of countries 1 and 2 be given by:
 [;] ≡ {[∗1 ( )] +1 }+ {[∗2 ( )] +2}
= [∗1 ( )] +[∗2 ( )]
where 1 +2 = 0 and  denotes the first two moments of the distributions of the random variables  17
The countries select a TA by comparing the total welfare corresponding to the three elements of  Specifically,
let ∗ be the chosen (equilibrium) agreement, Then,
Proposition 1 The agreement ∗ is chosen if and only if for all  ∈  :  [∗;]   [;] for all  6= ∗
Proof. (i) If  [∗;]   [;] for all  6= ∗ there must be corresponding transfers, given by ∗  where
∗1 + 
∗
2 = 0 such that [∗
∗
 ( )] + 
∗
  [∗ ( )] thus ∗ is preferred to any another agree-
ment. (ii) If ∗ is chosen, it must be better than any other agreement for both countries. In other words,
we must have: [∗∗ ( )] + 
∗
  [∗ ( )]  = 1 2 for all  6= ∗ where 
∗
1 + 
∗
2 = 0 Hence,
14Hence, (∗ ) will depend on the covariance between 1 and 2
15 In general, higher than second moments may also play a role, but given the linearity of demand and cost in the random variables,
they do not paly a role in our model.
16 In our context, both Nash Bargaining and the core are problematic. Specifically, the nature of the Nash bargaining “social
welfare function” (non-linear and multiplicative) combined with the existence of uncertainty and a multi-stage, multi-party game,
makes the solution intractable. The use of the core, on the other hand, does not always yield a unique equilibrium.
17Each country’s expected welfare depends on the first two moments of the vectors   because, as demonstrated in Appendix 8.2,
the welfare functions are quadratic in  .
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 [∗;] = [∗∗1 ( )]+
∗
1 + [∗
∗
2 ( )]+
∗
2 = [∗
∗
1 ( )]+[∗
∗
2 ( )]  [∗1 ( )] +[∗2 ( )]
= [;] for all  6= ∗18
4 Case 2: Late Resolution of Uncertainty
In Case 2, demand and cost conditions are already known when outputs are chosen, but still unknown when
tariﬀs and the TA are selected. Hence, Case 2 diﬀers from Case 1 in that tariﬀs are now chosen when the state
of the world is still unknown. Since the choice of outputs is the same as in Case 1, we can now go directly to the
tariﬀ-choice stage of the game under Case 2.
4.1 Case 2 Tariﬀ Choice: Stand Alone and Free Trade Area
In the  and  cases, the countries’ welfare functions are given by equation (9) The corresponding expected
welfare functions are then:
[(;  )] ≡ ()  =  
so that the three countries’ expected welfare maximization problems are given by:
max

{ ()}  = 13  =  }
It is quite simple to verify that each country’s expected welfare function,  (), is strictly concave and
quadratic in its own tariﬀ and additively separable in all tariﬀs. As was the case in Case 1, this separability
implies that tariﬀs are strategically neutral, so that we can solve for each  separately. In addition, the expected
welfare functions are: (i) functions of the first and second moments only, (ii) quadratic in the first moments, but
linear in the second moments and (iii) additively separable in all tariﬀs and all second moments.19
Let the (Case 2) Nash equilibrium tariﬀ in Country  = 13 for TA  =   be denoted as ∗ ()
Because of the separability in second moments, the solutions become (linear) functions of the first moments
only:
∗ () = 110[3()−
3X
=1
()]  = 13 (19)
∗ () = 17()−
1
21
() + 1
3
()− 3
7
(3)   = 1 2  6= 
∗3 () = 110[3(3)−
3X
=1
()]
18 It is useful to note that while the choice of agreement is always unique, the transfers are not uniquely determined. Since our
objective is to identify the optimal trade agreement this is not a major problem here.
19That is, all the cross partial derivatives of tariﬀs and second moments are zero, implying that each country’s  is unaﬀected by
the second moments.
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Note that, for each country, the solution is “similar” to the solution in Case 1 above, except for the fact that
here it is with respect to the expected values, rather than the actual values, of the random variables.
Now, define the corresponding Nash equilibrium expected welfare in each country, in Case 2, as:
∗ () = [∗()]  = 13  =   (20)
where ∗() = [∗1 () ∗2 () ∗3 ()] is the vector of equilibrium tariﬀs. The Nash equilibrium expected
welfare for country  can be easily calculated. It is given by:
∗ () =
3X
=1
(2 + 2) +
3X
=1
¡2 + 2¢+ (21)
3X
=16=
3X
=16=
( + ) +
3X
=1
3X
=1

where the parameters  ,  and  are given in Appendix 8.2. Thus, the Nash equilibrium expected welfare for
Country  is a function of the first two moments. Moreover, it can be easily seen that it is (i) linear in all second
moments and (ii) quadratic and convex in the first moments (from the convexity of the welfare functions in the
random variables).
4.2 Case 2 Tariﬀ Choice: Customs Union ()
When there is a CU between County 1 and Country 2 in the first stage, the countries’ welfare functions are given
by (15) and the corresponding expected welfare functions are
[(;  )] ≡ ()
where  = ( 3 )
Again, we assume that countries 1 and 2 choose their common tariﬀ by maximizing (a social welfare function
which is simply) the sum of their expected welfare:
( 3 ;) = 1 ( 3 ;) +2 ( 3 ;)
The problems of the CU and Country 3 are, now, given by:
Max

{( 3 ;)} and Max3 {

3 ( 3 ;)}
Ananlogously to the  and  cases, the ( 3 ) and 3 ( 3 ) functions are strictly concave
in their respective tariﬀs and each is quadratic in its “own” tariﬀ while being additively separable in all tariﬀs.
Again, the objective functions are linearly additively separable in tariﬀs and second moments, which implies that
tariﬀs are unaﬀected by the second moments.
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Let the Nash equilibrium tariﬀs be defined as ∗ () ∗3 () The explicit expressions for ∗ ()and
∗3 () are given by:
∗ ( ) = 538 [(1) +(2)] +
1
19
[(1) + (2)]− 7
19
(3) (22)
∗3 ( ) = 110[3(3)−
3X
=1
()]
These are the “same” as in Case 1, except that here we have the expected values of the random variables, instead
of the random variables themselves. Consequently, the same properties hold with respect to the means.
The corresponding Nash equilibrium expected welfare in each country can be written as:
∗ () ≡  [∗ () ∗3 ()]  = 13 (23)
The Nash equilibrium expected welfare for Country  can now be easily calculated and is given by equations (21),
with the superscript changed to  instead of  where the parameters are given in Appendix 8.2. Its properties
are the same as in the  case above.
4.3 Stage 1: The Choice of Trade Agreement
In stage 1, countries 1 and 2 choose a TA. Again, as in Case 1, we assume that they choose their TA by
maximizing total expected welfare which, for any  ∈  ≡ {  ) is given by:
 [;] ≡ {∗1 () +1}+ {∗2 () +2 } =∗1 () +∗2 ()
where 1 +2 = 0 Thus, the countries select a TA, by comparing the total welfare corresponding to the three
elements of  Specifically, let ∗ be the chosen (equilibrium) agreement, Then,
Proposition 2 The agreement ∗ is chosen if and only if for all  ∈  :  [∗;]   [;] for all  6= ∗
Proof. (i) If  [∗;]   [;] for all  6= ∗ there must be corresponding transfers, given by ∗  where
∗1 + 
∗
2 = 0 such that ∗
∗
 () + 
∗
  ∗ () +   thus ∗ is preferred to any another agreement.
(ii) If ∗ is chosen, it must be better than any other agreement for both countries. In other words, we must
have: ∗∗ () + 
∗
  ∗ () +    = 1 2 for all  6= ∗ where 
∗
1 + 
∗
2 = 0 Hence,  [∗;] =
∗∗1 ()+
∗
1 + ∗
∗
2 ()+
∗
2 = ∗
∗
1 ()+ ∗
∗
2 ()  ∗1 ()+∗2 () =  [;] for all  6= ∗20
5 Preferred Trade Agreements with Uncertainty
In this section we examine the eﬀects of uncertainty on the choice of TAs in both the early and late resolution
of uncertainty cases. To help illuminate the impact of uncertainty, we start with the benchmark case of no
uncertainty.
20Again, it is useful to note that while the choice of agreement is always unique, the transfers are not uniquely determined.
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5.1 Benchmark Case: No Uncertainty
First, note that with no uncertainty, all variances and covariances are zero. Thus, the timing of the resolution of
uncertainty is irrelevant. Consequently, Cases 1 and 2 are identical. Second, to be able to compare the certainty
and uncertainty cases, we need to assign values to the variables  and  in the no uncertainty case. We follow
the standard practice and assume that the certain values are given by the means of the random variables.
In principle, given that we have closed form solutions for member country preferences over diﬀerent TAs in
a certain world, we can present these preferences in simple diagrams. But, since we have six parameters (the
values of  and   = 13 taken as their means) there are twelve possible two-dimensional diagrams. Hence,
for illustrative purposes, we provide two diagrams that show TA preferences for countries 1 and 2, drawn in their
mean demands/costs space. The fixed values of the other four parameters are given in the Figures below.
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Figure 1: Member country preferences over trade agreement types when there is no uncertainty (all variances
and covariances are zero). We assume: 3 = 1 and 1 = 2 = 3 = 12 (left diagram); 1 = 2 = 3 = 1
and 3 = 12 (right diagram).
When member countries have suﬃciently similar demands (everything else being identical), they prefer  to
any other type of TA. When member demands diverge too much, however,  is preferred. This can be seen
in the left-hand panel of Figure 1. Note that member countries will continue to prefer  when their demands
are suﬃciently similar even if their costs of production diﬀer significantly. This can be seen in the right-hand
panel of Figure 1. While members always prefer  in this case, if production costs diverge suﬃciently, members
prefer  to .
The intuition underlying the results in Figure 1 is as follows. When member countries are suﬃciently similar,
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policy coordination in a CU is preferable since it allows members to extract additional rent from the excluded
country compared to a FTA (or standing alone). This is because, under , a member country’s optimal tariﬀs
depend on both its own costs (negatively) and its partner’s costs (positively). However, if countries are too
dissimilar, then the common external tariﬀ chosen under  will be costly in the sense that it will most likely lie
further away from each member country’s preferred (unilateral) external tariﬀ.
In our model, when there is no uncertainty,  and  are typically preferred by members to  since they
receive preferential treatment (zero tariﬀ) under the former but not under the latter. Note, however, that the
preference for  over  when member costs diverge arises from the fact that trade will expand as the (very)
high-cost country imports more from the (very) low cost country. In this case, the zero tariﬀs associated with
 are very costly in terms of foregone tariﬀ revenue and so  is preferred.
5.2 The Eﬀects of Uncertainty in Case 1
In this section we analyze how changes in the degree and nature of uncertainty (resolved early) influence
member country preferences over diﬀerent types of TAs. We examine both the impact and marginal eﬀects of
uncertainty. To investigate the impact eﬀect, we compare preferences over TAs under uncertainty with the case
when all second moments are zero, holding demand and cost parameters fixed at theirmean values. To investigate
the marginal eﬀect we look at the consequences of small changes in variances and covariances. The marginal
eﬀects of uncertainty are obtained from comparative statics, using the explicit solutions given in Appendix 8.2.
Given the complexity of the model (due to the: (i) multi-stage nature of the problem, (ii) number of countries
(iii) number of random variables, (iv) existence of uncertainty), it is diﬃcult to obtain global comparative statics
results.21 Nevertheless, we provide insights into the relationship between the nature of uncertainty and country
welfare and consequently, the choice of TAs.
First, as an example, let us consider what happens when demand (but, for now, no cost) uncertainty is
gradually introduced into the model, in a world of early uncertainty resolution. Figure 2 shows the 
indiﬀerence loci for diﬀerent (21 22) pairs. For any (21 22) pair,  is preferred in the area “between” the
two “arms” of the indiﬀerence locus, whereas  is preferred outside of this area ( is everywhere the least
preferred). Note that the no-uncertainty case is captured by the (two arms of the) linear indiﬀerence locus
corresponding to the pair: 21 = 22 = 0 As either demand variance increases, the indiﬀerence locus moves up
(along the main diagonal), becoming curved. As Figure 2 shows, when either variance increases, countries 1 and
2 are more likely to prefer  to  (i.e. the former is preferred for a wider range of mean demand parameters).
21 See Appendix 8.2 for a demonstration of this complexity.
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Figure 2: The impact of demand uncertainty on TA choice, in Case 1: 23 = 2 = 0  = 12 ∀;  =  = 0
∀ ; 3 = 1
Figure 2 provides a simple example of the eﬀects of uncertainty. But, even in the general model with
uncertainty, we can still obtain closed form solutions for member country preferences over TAs. The presentation
of our results, however, becomes much more complicated because we now have many more parameters (six first
moments and 21 second moments from the symmetric 66 variance/covariance matrix). Thus, for example,
there are far too many possible two-dimensional diagrams. From an expositional view point it is, therefore, more
convenient to present our results in propositions, where some of the parameters have been assigned fixed values.
Specifically, in the remainder of this section, we assume that all countries are identical with respect to the mean
values of their demand and cost parameters; that is,  =   =   = 13.22 It is important to note that
by taking the countries to be symmetric, our results are, by construction, biased in favour of  In other words,
our conditions for preference for  are too strict: we may be able to relax them for non-symmetric countries,
so that  may be preferred over an even larger set of parameter values.
We now derive two propositions that, for Case 1, relate the nature and degree of uncertainty to the preferred
TAs of countries 1 and 2.23
Proposition 3 Consider a world in which the only uncertainty relates to the demands of TA members and this
22 In addition to our assumtion in Section 2.1 that  ( ) = 0
23 In the following propositions, we assume that lump sum transfers are possible between Countries 1 and 2.
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uncertainty is resolved early (Case 1). Then, there exists a value  (which depends on   12 and is defined
in Appendix 8.3) such that: (i) the ranking of TAs is:  Â  Â  if 21 + 22   and  Â  Â  if
21 + 22   (ii) an increase in either 21 or 22 makes it more likely for  to be preferred to  (iii) the
attractiveness of  relative to  decreases with  and 12 but increases with 24
Proof. See Appendix 8.3.
Proposition 4 Consider a world in which the only uncertainty relates the costs of TA members and this un-
certainty is resolved early (Case 1). Then, there exists two values   = 1 2 (which depend on   12 and
are defined in Appendix 8.4) such that: (i) the ranking of TAs is: (a)  Â  Â  if 21 + 22  1 (b)
 Â  Â  if 1  21 + 22  2 (c)  Â  Â  if 21 + 22  2 (ii) an increase in either 21 or
22 makes it less likely for  to be preferred to either  or  (iiia) ranking (a) becomes more likely when 
or 212 increase, but it becomes less likely when  increases, (iiib) ranking (b) becomes more likely when  or
212 increase, but less likely when  increases, (iiic) ranking (c) becomes more likely when  increases, but less
likely when either  or 212 increase.
Proof. See Appendix 8.4.
Propositions 3 and 4 imply that, when uncertainty is resolved early, TA members prefer:
(a)  to a  when either (i) demand uncertainty in member countries is suﬃciently high or (ii) cost uncer-
tainty in member countries is suﬃciently low.
(b)  to  when cost uncertainty is suﬃciently acute (the ranking of  versus may be important because
for reasons exogenous to the model, e.g., political, a customs union may not be feasible).
(c)  to  always.
To better appreciate the results above, it is useful to note that, in Case 1 (since optimal tariﬀs are functions of
the random variables), a marginal change in any country’s demand or cost variance has both tariﬀ-independent
and tariﬀ-dependent eﬀects on expected welfare (see Appendices 8.1 and 8.2 for the decomposition of the overall
eﬀect). It is easy to confirm that, for each country, the coeﬃcients of the tariﬀ-independent eﬀects are identical
(for all second moments) for each type of TA.25 In other words, any change in the ranking of TA types (by
member countries) arising from a marginal change in either   () or   () must be attributed to the tariﬀ-
dependent eﬀect and hence, related to the diﬀerent optimal tariﬀs chosen under each type of TA (which, in turn,
24Note that each strict preference becomes an indiﬀerence when we have an equality instead of an inequality (for the parameter
range). The same is true in all the following propositions.
25 See Appendix 8.1.
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imply that changes in uncertainty aﬀects these tariﬀs diﬀerently and furthermore, changes in the diﬀerent tariﬀs
aﬀect welfare diﬀerently).26
Note that Propositions 3 and 4 explain both the rankings of diﬀerent TAs and the eﬀects of marginal changes
in uncertainty on these rankings. Proposition 5 below further elaborates and helps us understand the eﬀects
of marginal changes in uncertainty. Specifically, calculating the magnitudes of the tariﬀ-dependent eﬀects of a
marginal change in   () or   ()   = 1 2 on countries 1 and 2 (the TA members), reveals that:
Proposition 5 In Case 1, a marginal increase in the demand or cost variance of a TA member: (i) increases
their own preference for  relative to  while decreasing that of their partner, (ii) the magnitude of the latter
(i.e. partner-country) eﬀect is greater for marginal changes in demand uncertainty and smaller for marginal
changes in cost uncertainty.
Proof. See Appendix 8.5.
Given that TA members are assumed to maximize total joint expected welfare, and given our assumption that
lump sum transfers are possible between members, Proposition 5 implies that a marginal increase in   () 
 = 1 2 will make countries 1 and 2 jointly more likely to prefer  over . On the other hand, a marginal
increase in   ()   = 1 2 will make countries 1 and 2 jointly more likely to prefer  over .
Of course, uncertainty can also change via a marginal change in (member) demand or cost covariances; that
is,  or . Such changes also influence country welfare through both tariﬀ-independent and tariﬀ-dependent
eﬀects. Once again, for each country, the tariﬀ-independent eﬀects of a marginal change in covariance are identical
across diﬀerent TA types. In other words, any change in the welfare ranking of TAs by member countries must
be due to the tariﬀ-dependent eﬀects and, hence, the related to the diﬀerent optimal tariﬀs chosen under each
agreement type.
Propositions 3 and 4 reflect the preceding discussion and confirm Proposition 5. In Proposition 3, as the
variance of member demands increases, member countries increasingly prefer  to . In Proposition 4, however,
as member cost variances increase they are more likely to prefer a  instead. Moreover, Propositions 3 and 4
demonstrate that, in Case 1, covariances play a crucial role in determining member preferences over TA types.
In particular,  is more likely to be preferred if either: (i) member demands are negatively correlated or (ii)
member costs are positively correlated.
26This can be seen in Appendix 8.1 where diﬀerences in the 1  are due to diﬀerences in the  but also, diﬀerences in the
1  functions themselves. In fact, it is straightforward to calculate the size of the tariﬀ-dependent eﬀect of a marginal change in
uncertainty. First, the magnitude of the total eﬀect of a marginal change in variance on any member country’s welfare is given by
the coeﬃcient of the relevant 2 or 2 terms in the welfare functions derived in Appendix 8.2. For example, for a marginal increase
in   (1), Country 1’s welfare increases in total by 25 in ,
5
14
in the case of  and by 871
2432
in the case of  while Country
2’s welfare increases in total by 1
100
under , 4
49
under  and 167
2432
under  The diﬀerence between these total eﬀects and the
tariﬀ-independent eﬀects yields the magnitudes of the tariﬀ-dependent eﬀects. For example, in the case of , a marginal increase
in   (1) yields a tariﬀ-dependent eﬀect of 3224 (i.e., 514 − 1132 ) on Country 1 and 15784 (i.e., 449 − 116 ) on Country 2.
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Proposition 4 also shows that, in Case 1,  will be preferred to  (but not to ) if member cost variances
are suﬃciently high and/or member costs are suﬃciently negatively correlated. This result is analogous to the
no-uncertainty case illustrated in Section 5.1. The more diﬀerent are member costs, the greater the foregone
tariﬀ revenue implied by . In the case of , however, the welfare benefits of policy coordination still outweigh
the welfare costs of this foregone tariﬀ revenue.
5.3 The Eﬀects of Uncertainty in Case 2
Since, in Case 2, tariﬀs depend only on the means, it is clear that, here, marginal changes in uncertainty only
have a tariﬀ-independent eﬀect, but no tariﬀ-dependent eﬀects on (expected) country welfare. In Case 2 (unlike
in Case 1), therefore, tariﬀs play no role when there is a marginal change in the degree or nature of uncertainty.
As such, the comparative static (expected) welfare impacts of such changes are identical across all TA types.
This is confirmed by inspecting the equilibrium welfare functions in Appendix 8.2 and noting that the relevant
coeﬃcients on the 2, 2 and  terms are identical for all TA types. Proposition 6 summarizes these results.
Proposition 6 Consider a world in which there is demand and/or cost uncertainty and this uncertainty is
resolved late (Case 2). The ranking of TAs is, then,  Â  Â  ∀   and for all 2 2  ∀ 
Proof. See Appendix 8.6.
Proposition 6 shows that, in Case 2, the welfare ranking of diﬀerent TA types by prospective member countries
does not change with the nature of uncertainty. In particular,  is always the most preferred TA type and  is
always the least preferred. Intuitively, any option value associated with TA flexibility is less prominent in Case
2 than in Case 1 since, in the former case, member countries do not have the opportunity to choose their tariﬀs
optimally after the uncertainty has been resolved.
6 Preferred Timing of Tariﬀ Choice in a Trade Agreement
In this section, we investigate the preferred timing of tariﬀ decisions by TA members (rather than the preferred
agreements themselves). As in Section 5, we take all countries to be identical with respect to the mean value of
the demand and production cost parameters, i.e.  =  and  = . The second moments, however, can
diﬀer across countries.
We derive two propositions. Proposition 7 considers member-country preferences over the timing of tariﬀ
choice in a TA when there is only demand uncertainty. Proposition 8 relates to the timing of tariﬀ choice in the
presence of cost uncertainty only.27 Let () denote an agreement of type  =    in case  = 1 2 (early
and late resolution of uncertainty).
27 In this section, for simplicity we also assume that 12 = 0
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Proposition 7 Consider a world in which the only uncertainty relates to the demands of TA members. Then,
there exists values   = 14 (which depend on   and are defined in Appendix 8.7), such that the ranking
of TAs is as follows:
(1) Â (2) Â (1) Â (2) Â (1) Â (2) if 21 + 22  1
(1) Â (1) Â (2) Â (2) Â (1) Â (2) if 1  21 + 22  2
(1) Â (1) Â (2) Â (2) Â (1) Â (2) if 2  21 + 22  3
(1) Â (1) Â (2) Â (1) Â (2) Â (2) if 3  21 + 22  4
(1) Â (1) Â (1) Â (2) Â (2) Â (2) if 21 + 22  4
Proof. See Appendix 8.7.
Proposition 8 Consider a world in which the only uncertainty relates to the costs of TA members. Then, there
exists values   = 14 (which depend on   and are defined in Appendix 8.8), such that the ranking of TAs
is as follows:
(2) Â (1) Â (2) Â (1) Â (2) Â (1) if 21 + 22  1
(2) Â (2) Â (1) Â (1) Â (2) Â (1) if 1  21 + 22  2
(2) Â (2) Â (1) Â (2) Â (1) Â (1) if 2  21 + 22  3
(2) Â (2) Â (2) Â (1) Â (1) Â (1) if 3  21 + 22  4
(2) Â (2) Â (2) Â (1) Â (1) Â (1) if 21 + 22  4
Proof. See Appendix 8.8.
Propositions 7 and 8 demonstrate that, in the presence of little (or no) uncertainty, member countries are
predisposed to prefer  most and  least regardless of the timing of the resolution of uncertainty. The option
value of TA flexibility is very low in such cases.
As uncertainty rises, these preference orderings alter. Proposition 7 shows that as demand uncertainty in-
creases, TA members increasingly prefer any TA in which they can choose tariﬀs after the resolution of uncer-
tainty. When demand uncertainty is suﬃciently high, countries even prefer standing alone to any TA in which
tariﬀs are chosen before the resolution of uncertainty. These results once again reflect the fact that the option
value associated with TA flexibility is most valuable if member countries have the opportunity to choose their
tariﬀs optimally after the uncertainty has been resolved (i.e. as in Case 1). On the other hand, as cost uncer-
tainty rises, Proposition 8 shows that prospective TA members increasingly prefer any TA in which tariﬀs are
chosen before the resolution of uncertainty.
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7 Conclusion
This paper analyzes how the nature of uncertainty, as well as the timing of its resolution, influence the choice of
TA’s. Using a partial equilibrium, imperfect competition model of trade we demonstrate that, provided members
can make some optimizing decisions after uncertainty is resolved, there is an option value associated with all
types of TA. In deciding which type of TA to form, member countries balance the option value of the TA against
all the other costs and benefits associated with policy coordination and free trade that typically arise when
TAs form. Contrary to most of the existing theoretical literature on regional TAs, but consistent with observed
behavior, we show that countries will often prefer shallower trade integration to deeper trade integration. In
particular, when uncertainty is resolved early, a FTA will be chosen in preference to a CU when member demand
uncertainty is suﬃciently high or member cost uncertainty is suﬃciently low. When uncertainty is resolved late,
we find that prospective member preferences over diﬀerent TA types are invariant to the nature of uncertainty; a
CU is always preferred. Our results also have implications for the preferred timing of tariﬀ choice by prospective
TA members. As their demand uncertainty increases, prospective members are more likely to prefer any TA in
which they can choose tariﬀs after the resolution of uncertainty. On the other hand, as their cost uncertainty
rises, prospective members are more likely to prefer any TA in which they choose tariﬀs before the resolution of
uncertainty.
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8 Appendix
8.1 Explicit solutions for Country 1 welfare, 1(;  ) Case 1
Let us define: 1( ) ≡ 113212+ 116
X
 6=1
2+ 553212− 38
X
 6=1
1+ 18
X
6=1
X
 6=1
− 1716
X
 6=1
1+ 732
X
6=1
X
 6=1
−
9
1611 − 116
X
 6=1
1
1 (;  ) ≡ 3811 − 18
3X
=1
1 − 58 (1 )2 + 14
X
 6=1
( )2 − 14
X
 6=1
 + 34
X
 6=1
1 − 14
X
6=1
X
 6=1

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1 (;  ) ≡ 31611 − 11611 + 71621 − 91631 − 2132 21 + 116 22 + 14 23 + 1822 − 1433 −
3
812 + 3413 + 18
X
6=
2 − 14
X
6=1
3
1 (;  ) ≡ 3161− 7161+ 9162− 7163− 1932 ()2 + 14 (3 )2+ 182− 1433 + 3413 − 14
X
6=1
3
Then, the explicit expressions for Country 10 welfare as a function of tariﬀs, in Case 1, (equations (9), (16),
with  between Countries 1 and 2), 1(;  )  =    is given by: 1 = 1( )+1 (;  )
1 = 1( ) +1 (;  ) and 1 = 1( ) +1 (;  )
Note that the 1 (;  ) functions are concave in Country 1’s tariﬀ, spareable in all tariﬀs and linear in all
the random variables. But, in addition, the 1 (;  ) functions themselves also diﬀer for diﬀerent 0 (TAs),
namely: for equal values of  =  we have: 1(;  ) 6= 1 (;  ) if  6= 
8.2 Explicit solutions for equilibriummember-country welfare ((∗1 ) 
∗
1 ) : Case
1 and 2
The solutions for equilibrium expected welfare of Country 1 for each TA, in Cases 1 and 2, are given below.
These provide the parameter values in: equations( 13), the corresponding equations for  and  in Case 1
and equations (21) in Case 2 (for the   and  cases). The solutions are similar for Country 2.
Case 1:
(∗1 ) ≡ [(∗( );  )] = [2512 + 110022 + 110032 − 3511 − 75012 − 75013 − 11021 + 35022 +
3
5023 − 11031 + 35032 + 35033 + 795012 + 72522 + 72532 − 575012 − 575013 + 142523]
(∗1 ) ≡ [(∗( );  )] = [ 51412+ 44922+ 110032− 4711− 82112− 75013+ 2014722+ 35023−
1
731 + 44932 + 35033 + 9637630012 + 138194410022 + 1591490032 − 3373315012 − 941105013 + 1823735023]
(∗1 ) ≡ [(∗( );  )] = [ 871243212 + 167243222 + 110032 + 25121612 − 477611 − 337612 − 75013 −
1
7621+ 157622+ 35023− 53831+ 33832+ 35033+ 3081190012+ 521190022+ 621190032− 1049950 12− 89995013+ 27195023]
Tariﬀ-independent and Tariﬀ-dependent Eﬀects of Uncertainty:
For example, consider the eﬀect of 1 on [∗1 ]  =   . First note that [∗1 ] is given by (using
the expressions for 1  in the previous Appendix): [(∗( );  )] = (1) + [1 (∗;  )] where the
random variables are given by equation (1) above. Thus (using equation (1)), a change in 1 has both tariﬀ-
independent and tariﬀ-dependent eﬀects on expected welfare. This is can be seen as follows: [1(∗();)]1 =
[1(∗();)]
1 +
[1(∗();)]
∗()
∗()
1
1
1 =
[1]
1 +[
[1 (
∗;)]
1 +
[1 (
∗;)]
∗()
∗()
1 ]
1
1 ≡ tariﬀ-
independent eﬀect+ tariﬀ-dependent eﬀect.28 Note that since every ∗ includes all 0 but not all 0 ( and
 cases include only the “own” demand parameter, whereas  includes both members’ demand parameters),
cost uncertainty eﬀects are more complex than demand uncertainty eﬀects.29
28Note that [1 (∗ ( ) ;  )]1 = consmer surplus/ 1 + total profits/ 1 + tariﬀ revenues/ 1
29For example, in Appendix 8.1, [1 (;  )] contains two terms ((
3
8
11 ) −[
5
8

1
2
]) involving 1 but 1 is included
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Case 2:
∗1 = 5532
¡21 + 21¢+ 732 ¡22 + 22¢+ 732 ¡23 + 23¢+ 1132 ¡21 + 21¢+ 116 ¡22 + 22¢+ 116 ¡23 + 23¢−
17
16 (12 + 12)− 1716 (13 + 13)+ 716 (23 + 23)+ 916021− 2140022− 2140023− 3511− 75021
− 75031− 11180021− 11012+ 35022+ 35032− 3140012+ 4980022− 11013+ 35023+ 35033
− 3140013 + 4940023 + 4980023
∗1 = 5532
¡21 + 21¢+ 732 ¡22 + 22¢+ 732 ¡23 + 23¢+ 1132 ¡21 + 21¢+ 116 ¡22 + 22¢+ 116 ¡23 + 23¢−
17
16 (12 + 12)− 1716 (13 + 13)+ 716 (23 + 23)+ 322421+ 1578422− 2140023− 4711− 82121−
7
5031 − 95295040021 + 2014722 + 35032 − 2092520012 + 3337735280022 − 1713 + 44923 + 35033+
1397
840013 − 111415880023 + 41533920023
∗1 = 5532
¡21 + 21¢+ 732 ¡22 + 22¢+ 732 ¡23 + 23¢+ 1132 ¡21 + 21¢+ 116 ¡22 + 22¢+ 116 ¡23 + 23¢−
17
16 (12 + 12)− 1716 (13 + 13) + 716 (23 + 23) + 35243221 + 15243222 − 2140023 − 477611+
25
121612−+ 716 (23 + 23)+ 35243221+ 15243222− 2140023− 477611+ 25121612− 337621− 75031
− 14771520021 + 17612 + 157622 + 35032 − 317760012 + 8431520022 − 53813 + 33823 + 35033+
883
760013 − 1157760023 + 16431520023.
8.3 Proof of Proposition 3
Given the sums of expected welfare of Countries 1 and 2, in Cases 1 and 2 (defined by  [;], and  [;] in
Sections 3.3 sand 4.3), we define the diﬀerences in Countries’ 1 and 2 total expected welfare, for  =   
as follows.30 In case 1, let: 1_ =  [] − []  1_ =  [] − [] and 1_ =
 []− []  Similarly, in case 2, let: 2_ = []− []  2_ = []− []
and 2_ = []− [] 
Assume that there is only demand uncertainty. Define  = 2450713 12 + 1024713 [ − ]2  Therefore, for Case 1
and assuming that  =  and  =  ∀ it is straightforward to show that ∀ : 1_  0 if 21+22  
1_  0 if 21 + 22  −1250511 12 − 2272511 [ − ]2 and 1_  0 since 21 + 22  −2 [ − ]2  From
the definition of  it is clear that   0   0 12  0 which proves part (iii). ¥
8.4 Proof of Proposition 4
Consider Case 1, where there is only cost uncertainty. Define 1 = 28022112 − 72221 [ − ]2  2 = 3052374 12 +
1269
374 [ − ]2  It is straightforward to show that ∀ : 1_  0 if 21+22  1 1_  0 if 21+22 
−212 − 7134 [ − ]2  1_  0 if 21 + 22  2 The eﬀects of changes in   12 on 1 and 2 (thus,
in six terms (−1
8
[11 ]−
5
8

1
2  1
4

 6=1


2  3
4

 6=1
1 )
30Note that  and  can only be formed by Countries 1 and 2.
25
the range of the three regions) follow directly from the definitions of 1 and 2¥
8.5 Proof of Proposition 5
Consider Case 1. Let 1_ = [∗1 ( )]− [∗1 ( )]. It can be shown that for   = 1 2: 
1
_ 
2

0 1_ 2  0
 6=1_ 
2
 0 and 
 6=1
_ 
2
 0 Moreover, it can also be shown that for   = 1 2: 1_ 2 
 6=1_ 
2
and
1_ 
2
 
 6=1
_ 
2
¥
8.6 Proof of Proposition 6
For Case 2 we have: (i) 2_ = 16931 [ − ]2 ≥ 0 ∀   and for all 2 2  ∀  (ii) 2_ =
71
950 [ − ]2 ≥ 0, ∀   and for all 2 2  ∀  (iii) 2_ = 1412450 [ − ]2 ≥ 0, ∀   and for
all 2 2  ∀ ¥
8.7 Proof of Proposition 7
Define 1 ≡ 512969 [ − ]2  2 ≡  3 ≡ 75249 [ − ]2  4 ≡ 113657 [ − ]2  With demand uncertainty:
(1)  []− [;] = 251216
£21 + 22 + 212¤ ≥ 0 (2)  []− [;] =
1024[−]2+1225[21+22]+2450212
59584 ≥ 0 (3) []− [;] = 2272[−]
2+625[21+22]+125012
30400 ≥ 0 (4)
 []− [;] = −512[−]2+969[21+22]29792
µ
≥

¶
0, if 21+22
µ
≥

¶
1 (5)  []− [;] =
51
1568
£21 + 22¤ ≥ 0 (6)  [] − [;] = 3{752[−]2+425[21+22]}39200 ≥ 0 (7)  [] − [;] =
−1136[−]2+57[21+
2
2]
15200
µ
≥

¶
0, if 21+22
µ
≥

¶
4 (8) []− [;] = 3{−752[−]
2+49[21+
2
2]}
39200µ
≥

¶
0, if 21+22
µ
≥

¶
3 (9) []− [;] = 3800
£21 + 22¤ ≥ 0 The proposition follows directly
from these conditions and from those in Propositions 3 and 6.¥
8.8 Proof of Proposition 8
Define 1 ≡ 640015533 [ − ]2  2 ≡ 1015216633 [ − ]2  3 ≡ 568317 [ − ]2  4 ≡ 2− 3052374 12With only cost uncer-
tainty: (1) []− [;] = − 3177600
£21 + 22¤ ≤ 0 (2) []− [;] = 6400[−]2−15533[21+22]372400µ
≥

¶
0 if 21+22
µ
≤

¶
1 (3) []− [;] = 568[−]
2−317[21+22]
7600
µ
≥

¶
0 if 21+22
µ
≤

¶
3
(4) []− [;] = −57600[−]2−316597[21+22]3351600 ≤ 0 (5) []− [;] = −16633[
2
1+
2
2]
176400 ≤ 0
(6) []− [;] = 10152[−]2−16633[21+22]176400
µ
≥

¶
0 if 21+22
µ
≤

¶
2 (7) []− [;] =
−568[−]2−589[21+22]
7600 ≤ 0 (8)  [] −  [;] = −1128[−]
2−1519[21+22]
19600 ≤ 0 (9)  [] −
 [;] = − 31400
£21 + 22¤ ≤ 0. The proposition follows directly from these conditions and from those in
Propositions 4 and 6.¥
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